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The Imaginary Reagan Revolution:
On the Conservative Undermining
of Radical Left-Wing Discourse
Bradley Smith
 
Introduction
1 The  presidency  of  Ronald  Reagan  (1981-1989)  is  often  referred  to  as  “The  Reagan
Revolution.” This appellation was actively promoted by Reagan’s supporters as soon as
the president took office, with journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak’s The Reagan
Revolution (1981) as one of the earliest examples. Insiders also used revolutionary rhetoric
when publishing their accounts of the Reagan administration. In The Triumph of Politics:
The  Inside  Story  of  the  Reagan  Revolution  (1987),  David  Stockman  explained  what  the
“revolution”  was  about:  “shrinking  Big  Government  […],  lower  tax  rates,  and a  vast
curtailment of  federal  spending,  welfare,  and subsidies” (2-3).  In other words,  it  was
about reversing the legacy of New Deal liberalism, which had more or less dominated
federal policymaking since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945). Although
David Stockman (1987) argued that the Reagan Revolution ultimately failed (9, 15), other
insiders—such as  Martin  Anderson in  Revolution:  The  Reagan  Legacy (1988)  and Peggy
Noonan in What I Saw at the Revolution (1990)—continued to highlight what they saw as
Reagan’s revolutionary legacy.1
2 Like David Stockman,  however,  a  number of  historians  in  the 1990s,  generally  more
critical of the Reagan presidency, contested the idea that a revolution had taken place in
the  1980s.  For  example,  Joseph  Hogan  in  The  Reagan  Years:  The  Record  in  Presidential
Leadership (1990), Larry M. Schwab in The Illusion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution (1991),
and Iwan W. Morgan in Beyond the Liberal Consensus: A Political History of the United States
since 1965 (1994) all argued that the scope of change during the Reagan years was much
narrower than what the rhetoric would suggest. Measuring the gap between the reality
and the rhetoric of the Reagan era thus became subject to historiographical debate.
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3 Despite such contentions,  the 21st century has seen a revival  of  “Reagan Revolution”
rhetoric.  Richard  C.  Thornton’s  four-volume  The  Reagan  Revolution  (2003-2013),  Craig
Shirley’s  Reagan’s  Revolution  (2005),  and Gil  Troy’s  The  Reagan Revolution:  A  Very  Short
Introduction (2009) are but a few examples of its presence in recent historical works. Some
historians have even extended the Reagan Revolution to include the Clinton presidency
(1993-2001).  Jack Godwin presents  this  in  a  positive  light  in  Clintonomics:  How Clinton
Reengineered the Reagan Revolution (2009), while Michael Meeropol, in Surrender: How the
Clinton Administration Completed the Reagan Revolution (2000), saw this continuity as a form
of capitulation. Similarly, the Marxist scholar David Harvey wrote in A Brief History of
Neoliberalism (2005) that “[f]uture historians may well look upon the years 1978-80 as a
revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history” (1), citing the
Reagan and Clinton presidencies as complimentary moments in the construction of a
neoliberal consensus (50-55, 62-63). These last two examples illustrate that the Reagan
Revolution hypothesis is not limited to conservative Republican discourse; it also includes
certain critics.  Moreover,  if  the Clinton administration offered no fundamental  break
with  the  Reagan  Revolution,  this  renders  the  Clinton  years  even  more  complex  to
interpret,  for the Democratic Platform of 1992 had promised its  own “revolution” to
overthrow “12 years […] of Republican irresponsibility and neglect” (¶ 1, 3).
4 The persistent use of revolutionary rhetoric by Reagan’s critics and sympathizers alike
raises a number of questions. Not only are scholarly debates on the gap between the
rhetoric  and  the  reality  of  the  Reagan  era  still  open,  but  the  resilience  of  Reagan
Revolution rhetoric has political and ideological significance in and of itself. For most of
the 20th century, “revolution” was almost exclusively associated with the radical left-wing
objective  to  overthrow the  capitalist  political  and economic  regime to  create  a  new
socialist order.  Conservatism was the antithesis to this sort of revolution. During the
Reagan era, however, it was conservatives who were allegedly carrying out a revolution.
Whether or not this revolution was real or imaginary is one thing; but if Reagan and his
supporters  at  least  managed to  enduringly  associate the  idea  of  “revolution” with a
conservative policy agenda, would this not serve as a powerful ideological buffer against
revolution in the radical left-wing sense? If so, this may well be part of Reagan’s historical
legacy:  an  imaginary  revolution  that  symbolically  undermined  the  political  Left  by
confiscating and mutating its terminology.
5 This paper will explore this hypothesis in two parts. The first part will analyze the use of
revolutionary rhetoric by Ronald Reagan himself when presenting his place in American
history. How did Reagan encourage historians and observers to think of his presidency in
terms  of  revolution,  and  how  was  this  revolution  to  be  understood?  Elements  of  a
response can be found by revisiting some of Reagan’s most emblematic speeches. The
second part will then analyze the political and ideological implications of certain changes
that indeed took place during and after the 1980s, so as to contribute to the debates
surrounding  Reagan’s  legacy  and  the  parallels  between  the  Reagan  and  Clinton
presidencies.  This  will  lead  us  to  revisit  the  ways  in  which  economic  data,  David
Stockman’s inside account, and other historical assessments all reveal a gap between the
rhetoric and the reality of this period.
6 Such a reassessment, of course, inevitably raises the question of historical objectivity—
which,  as  Peter  Novick  has  elegantly  shown,  is  among  the  “essentially  contested
concepts” whose “meaning […] will always be disputed” (Novick 1). It should therefore be
made clear that, by measuring the gap between reality and rhetoric, the aim of this paper
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is not to establish some definitive account of the “objective reality” of the Reagan era.
What interests us is the gap itself, namely the political and ideological consequences of
using revolutionary rhetoric to designate a reality that, however you interpret it, may
include important changes but does not correspond to most currently accepted meanings
of political revolution. If Reagan Revolution rhetoric has essentially stripped the word
“revolution” of its very meaning and put the American Left on the defensive, this may be
one way that conservatives politically and ideologically undermined anyone seeking real
alternatives to the established order.
 
Reagan and the Rhetoric of Revolution
7 As mentioned above, the notion of a Conservative Reagan Revolution is commonplace in
popular culture and academia, but how did Ronald Reagan himself contribute to forging
this historical narrative? Reagan’s own use of revolutionary rhetoric can perhaps best be
illustrated  by  analyzing  his  inaugural  addresses,  State  of  the  Union  addresses,  and
farewell address.
8 Karlyn  K.  Campbell  and  Kathleen  H.  Jamieson  have  argued  that  these  forms  of
presidential communication are distinct genres of the “rhetorical presidency” (1), each
with a specific set of functions. Inaugural addresses notably have a “symbolic function”
(29) of unifying the American people behind the new president, reasserting “communal
values drawn from the past” (31) and announcing the “political principles that will guide
the  new administration”  (31).  State  of  the  Union addresses  set  forth  more  concrete
“policy recommendations” based on the administration’s “assessments of  information
and issues” (139). Both genres offer presidents “the role of national historian, giving them
the opportunity to reconstruct the past  in order to forge the future” (137).  Farewell
addresses then allow them to bequeath their legacy (307). Although the generalization of
these  rhetorical  genres  is  subject  to  scholarly  debate  (see  Ryan  xvi-xix),  few would
disagree that such documents provide crucial insight into presidents’ political agendas
and  the  role  they  present  themselves  to  be  playing  in  history.  The  idea  that  the
Constitution periodically  offers  presidents  the  role  of  national  historian is  especially
interesting for our purposes, for the question to be asked is: What kind of revolution did
Reagan claim to be bringing about in American history?
 
Reagan’s “Revolutionary Conservatism”
9 It  goes without  saying that  Reagan never intended to replace the American political
system with a new one and even less to overthrow capitalism. This may seem obvious
enough, but it deserves mention because the commonly accepted political meaning of
“revolution” is a sequence of events by which a political regime is overthrown by the
governed, usually through a violent uprising, resulting in the abolition of the old system
and the constitution of a new one. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED), for example, defines
revolution as “a forceful overthrow of a government or social order in favor of a new
system.” It also mentions the Marxist notion of “the class struggle which is expected to
lead to  political  change and the triumph of  communism.”  Nobody would argue that
anything remotely close to any such events happened in the United States during the
1980s, making the “Reagan Revolution” expression all the more puzzling.
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10 It is otherwise well known that Reagan was firmly committed to upholding the American
political and economic system and to reversing the spread of communism, which had
gained ground in Asia, Africa, and Latin America since the 1960s. In his first inaugural
address, Reagan portrayed the historic role of the United States under his administration
as  doing  “whatever  needs  to  be  done  to  preserve  this  last  and  greatest  bastion  of
freedom” (Reagan, 1981a ¶ 7)—particularly by protecting it both against economic decline
at home and “the enemies of freedom” abroad (¶ 24). Thus, to the extent that Reagan’s
aim  was  to  conserve an  American  system  perceived  to  be  in  danger  and  to  counter 
revolutionary communist forces, “Conservative Counterrevolution,” as some historians
have suggested, may be a more accurate term to describe Reagan’s foreign and domestic
political agenda (see Tobin; Peterson; Hayward, 2009).
11 Yet, it must also be recognized that in terms of domestic policy, Reagan’s particular brand
of conservatism was not about preserving the status quo or resisting change. In order to
cure the economic ills  of  the time—namely,  inflation,  recession,  unemployment,  and,
according to conservative Republicans, a punitive tax burden, excessive public spending,
and overregulation—the administration called for significant policy shifts  in order to
reduce government intervention in the economy. This amounted to a head-on assault
against the liberal consensus that had reigned in American politics since the New Deal
and culminated in Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society—a consensus according to which
government  intervention  was  seen  as  the  standard  solution  to  social  and  economic
problems  (see  Hodgson  76).  Conservatives  had  struggled  to  reverse  this  tendency
throughout the postwar period (see Phillips-Fein; Smith): they formed a minority within
the Republican Party during the 1950s in relation to “modern Republicans” like Dwight D.
Eisenhower and Nelson Rockefeller, who were unfavorable to dismantling the New Deal
(see  Larson;  Stebenne);  and  they  failed  to  win  the  1964  presidential  bid  with  Barry
Goldwater, whom Reagan had famously endorsed (see Reagan, 1964). Even Richard Nixon,
who had also sought to break the liberal consensus, had an ambiguous legacy in the
matter.2
12 The attempt to overturn the liberal consensus was thus several decades in the making,
and to invert the tendency toward increased government intervention in the economy
would  entail  a  serious  overhaul  of  federal  economic  policy.  This  could  hardly  be
considered conservative in the sense of “averse to change or innovation” (OED). To the
extent  that  the  Reagan administration deemed an overthrow of  the  New Deal  order
necessary to renew and preserve the American political and economic system, the idea of
a “conservative revolution” may therefore be less contradictory than it seems.
 
Revolution as Restoration
13 Reagan’s  first  inaugural  address  provides  further  insight  into  the  meaning  of  this
revolutionary conservatism. Although the term “revolution” does not appear explicitly in
the speech, the following passage shows how Reagan did invite Americans to imagine a
parallel between his political objectives and the American Revolution:
[T]his administration’s objective will be a healthy, vigorous, growing economy that
provides equal opportunities for all Americans […]. All must share in the productive
work  of  this  “new  beginning,”  and  all  must  share  in  the  bounty  of  a  revived
economy. […] So, as we begin, let us take inventory. […] Our government has no
power except that granted it  by the people.  It  is  time to check and reverse the
growth of government, which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent of
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the  governed.  It  is  my  intention  to  curb  the  size  and  influence  of  the  Federal
establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between the powers
granted  to  the  Federal  Government  and  those  reserved  to  the  States  or  to the
people. All of us need to be reminded that the Federal Government did not create
the States; the States created the Federal Government. (Reagan, 1981a ¶ 10-11)
By suggesting that government had “grown beyond the consent of the governed,” Reagan
was clearly referring to the Declaration of Independence. It was in similar terms that the
American revolutionaries of the 18th century had justified their overthrow of the political
regime tying the Thirteen Colonies to Great Britain. Likewise, when Reagan reminded his
audience that it was the states that had created the Federal Government, this refers to the
later  phase  of  the  American  Revolution,  during  which  the  states  ratified  the  new
Constitution.  Thus,  in terms of  captivating Americans’  imagination and uniting them
around both traditional  communal  values  and a  program for  the future,  the Reagan
Revolution as “a new beginning” symbolized both renewal and a return to the nation’s
beginning—that is, a rebirth of the American Revolution.
14 This  is  actually  quite  consistent  with  another  meaning  of  revolution,  which  is  “the
movement of an object in a circular or elliptical course around another or about an axis
or center” (OED). Applied to political history, change occurring in this type of revolution
must  be  understood  as  taking  place  within  a  reoccurring  cycle.  Thus, just  as
revolutionaries  had  overthrown  British  colonial  rule  and  established  a  new form of
limited government in the beginning of the nation’s history, Reagan’s “new beginning”
supposedly  had  the  historic  role  of  reestablishing  the  principles  of  the  American
Revolution by reducing government powers that, according to conservatives, had once
again grown beyond the consent of the governed. Reagan would later corroborate this
interpretation explicitly  during his  second inaugural  address:  “Let  history  say  of  us:
‘These were golden years when the American Revolution was reborn’” (Reagan,  1985
¶ 15).
15 A cyclical version of revolution such as this one is close to what Hannah Arendt defined as
the ancient concept of revolution, where neither “political change [nor] the violence that
went with it […] appeared […] to bring about something altogether new,” but rather a
“different  stage”  in  a  “sempiternal  cycle”  (Arendt  21-23).  “The  modern  concept  of
revolution”, on the other hand, is “inextricably bound up with the notion that the course
of  history suddenly begins  anew” (28).  Hannah Arendt  considered the American and
French revolutions of the late 18th century to be the first modern revolutions in this sense
(28).
16 Yet, historians  have  long  debated  the  radicalism  of  the  American  Revolution  (see
Morgan).  Leading up to the Reagan era,  some historians like Daniel  Boorstin in 1953
argued that the American Revolution was fundamentally conservative, while others have
contested these conservative interpretations, such as Gordon S. Wood who, writing after
the Reagan years,  insisted on The Radicalism of  the American Revolution (1992).  For our
purposes, if the American Revolution was indeed a revolution in the modern sense of “a
forceful overthrow of a government or social order in favor of a new system” (OED),
“usher[ing] in an entirely new era” (Arendt 29), it must be admitted that a rebirth of such
radical change was not at all what the Reagan Revolution was about. In fact, the American
Revolution  had  to  be  considered  conservative  if  the  Reagan  Revolution  was  to  be
interpreted  as  a  rebirth  or  restoration  of  it.  Otherwise  it  would  have  been  about
overthrowing the system instead of conserving it.
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17 Reagan’s revolutionary rhetoric actually required the revival of an 18th-century meaning
of  revolution.  As  Carine  Lounissi  has  shown,  the  word  “revolution”  could  be  used
positively in the 18th century as a synonym for “restoration,” or the return to what was
considered the original and correct constitutional order (Lounissi 92).3 Such a restoration
was exactly what Reagan claimed his administration’s objective to be (1981a). Thus, the
scope of Reagan’s revolutionary rhetoric went beyond his own presidency: it implied both
a conservative interpretation of the American Revolution and a return to a premodern
meaning  of  revolution  that  did  not  imply  a  radical  regime  change,  but  rather  the
restoration of the existing regime to its supposedly original constitutional principles.
 
Revolution and Restoration as Reform
18 The concrete policy means by which the Reagan administration intended to accomplish
this revolution/restoration were published in its economic recovery program entitled
America’s New Beginning (Reagan, 1981b). The program included four main parts:
A budget reform plan to cut the rate of growth in federal spending;
A series of proposals to reduce personal income tax rates by 10 percent a year over
three years […];
A far-reaching program of regulatory relief;
And […] a new commitment to a monetary policy that will restore a stable currency
and healthy financial markets. (7)
As ambitious as these proposals may have been, they were not about setting up a new
form of  government;  they  were  presented  as  a  “comprehensive  package  [of  policies
proposed] in order to achieve a full and rigorous recovery of [the] economy” (Reagan,
1981b 7). This corresponds quite nicely to the definition of reform, which the American
Heritage Dictionary defines as “an action to improve or correct what is wrong or defective
in  something.”  In  Reagan’s  rhetoric,  revolution  becomes  restoration  and  ultimately
reform.  As  both  restoration  and  reform  are  generally  opposed  to  revolution  in  the
modern,  radical  sense,  we can already see  how Reagan Revolution rhetoric  tends  to
undermine the meaning of revolution by equating it to its opposites.
19 Moreover, it should be noted that each part of the policy package was implicitly designed
to counter the effects of various reforms enacted since the New Deal—reforms which,
according to conservative Republicans, were responsible for increased federal spending,
higher income tax rates, more regulations, and an ineffective monetary policy. If the goal
was to undo some of these reforms, then the term counter-reform would be appropriate in
such cases. Nevertheless, it was through a combination of reforms and counter-reforms
that the Reagan administration intended to restore the American economy and political
structure.  For example,  the budget proposals  called for several  Great Society welfare
programs to be cut or discontinued, but one of the top priorities was to preserve and
improve the economic efficiency of “essential social safety net programs” (Reagan, 1981b,
22)  such  as  Social  Security,  Medicare,  and  Medicaid.  Thus,  contrary  to  Reagan’s
revolutionary rhetoric, it seems that his concrete domestic policy agenda could best be
described in terms of reform and counter-reform.
20 From a communication standpoint, however, if Reagan-era policy reforms and economic
recovery could be redefined as revolutionary, then Reagan could symbolically present the
progress made on these levels as evidence of a successful revolution. This is precisely
what he did in his final State of the Union address (1988), poising himself once again as
national historian:
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Our record is not just the longest peacetime expansion in history but an economic
and social revolution of hope based on work, incentives, growth, and opportunity;
[…] a revolution that at a critical moment in world history reclaimed and restored
the American dream. (Reagan, 1988 ¶ 5)
Let us note the ambiguity of the expression “an economic and social revolution of hope.”
Renewing  hope  and  faith  in  the  existing  economic  and  social  order  of  American
capitalism is not the same thing as overthrowing this order in favor of a new system. A
revolution  of  hope  belongs  more  to  the  realm  of  the  imaginary,  that  is,  the  way
Americans imagine a brighter future and formulate dreams in relation to a real social and
economic order that is conserved, though perhaps reformed.
21 In terms of  real  political  upheavals  around the world during the 1980s,  Reagan also
claimed that his administration contributed to a “global democratic revolution” (Reagan,
1988 ¶ 7) by reversing the spread of communism: “In international relations, too, there’s
only  one  description for  what,  together,  we  have  achieved:  a  complete  turnabout,  a
revolution” (¶ 6). From a Marxist standpoint, the reversion from socialism to free market
capitalism  is  counterrevolutionary;  in  Reagan’s  rhetoric,  however,  counterrevolution
becomes revolution. The supreme model was once again the American Revolution: “All of
[these revolutionary achievements were] made possible by an idea I spoke of when Mr.
Gorbachev  was  here—the  belief  that  the  most  exciting  revolution  ever  known  to
humankind began with three simple words: ‘We the People’” (¶ 3). In other words, for
Reagan, the regime that resulted from the American Revolution was the only legitimate
reference point when it came to imagining political and economic alternatives.
22 When reflecting on his legacy during his farewell address (1989), Reagan put it this way: “
They called it the Reagan Revolution. Well, I’ll accept that, but for me it always seemed
more like the great rediscovery, a rediscovery of our values and our common sense” (
¶ 13). Common Sense being the title of Thomas Paine’s pamphlet calling for revolution in
1776, Reagan once again confiscated the radical rhetoric of the American Revolution to
define his conservative politics. In the end, the expression that stuck was not “The Great
Rediscovery” but indeed “The Reagan Revolution.” The “Great Communicator” succeeded
in forging a rhetorical  marriage of revolution and conservatism that would influence
historical categories for an entire generation.
 
Revolution? A Reassessment of Reagan’s Legacy
23 We  have  seen  how Reagan  actively  contributed  to  creating  a  historical  narrative  of
revolution in regards to his presidency. His actual legacy of revolution, however, is a
whole other question. A complete appraisal of what he did or did not achieve surpasses
the limits of this article. Others have presented their appraisals in the studies mentioned
in the introduction,  but  also in recent works by Sean Wilentz (2008)  and Stephen F.
Hayward (2009) on the “Age of Reagan.” Hugh Heclo has also recently assessed several
dimensions of Reagan’s presidency in order to underline its mixed legacies, arguing in
particular that,  despite the rhetoric,  there was no Reagan Revolution in social  policy
(Heclo 559-561). This conclusion echoes that of David Stockman, the radical supply-side
ideologue who served as director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) during
Reagan’s first term, and who wrote an insider’s account of how the Reagan Revolution,
according to him, was a failure (Stockman 15).  In the analysis that follows, it  will  be
argued that the gap between rhetoric and reality was indeed quite wide, but that the
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persistent  labeling  of  the  changes  that  did  happen  during  the  Reagan  years  as
“revolution”  generated  a  powerful  ideological  inversion  with  very  real  political
consequences.
 
Confiscating Left-wing Rhetoric
24 One of the ironies of the “Reagan Revolution” rhetoric is that it attributes the restoration
of America’s constitutional principles primarily to the work of one man, whereas the
Constitution of the United States was designed to make a one-man revolution impossible.
Whether it be revolution or counter-revolution, reform or counter-reform, the division of
power and the system of checks and balances were deliberately set up to prevent any one
person,  especially  the  president,  from wielding  so  much  power  as  to  be  capable  of
unilateral decision-making. Of course, Reagan always gave credit, not uniquely to himself,
but  to  the  American  people  for  propelling  his  political  agenda.  Yet,  the  idea  of  a
completely unified American people is a myth in and of itself—a myth that the “rhetorical
presidency”  largely  contributes  to  creating  (Campbell  &  Jamieson  31).  Even  though
Reagan did have the support of a majority of Americans,4 Congress was also supposed to
represent the will of the people; and the constitutional system of representation (instead
of direct democracy) and divided power (instead of absolute monarchy) was meant to
render radical change virtually impossible within the system, whether it be promoted by
a majority, a minority, or the president himself (see Hamilton, Madison, & Jay 60-69). In
this sense, the idea of a revolution within the system seems antithetical to the American
constitutional framework.
25 Given that  Reagan was  pledged to  defending the  Constitution and that  it  is  not  the
president but Congress that has the power to pass tax, budget, and regulatory reforms, it
can reasonably be assumed that Reagan’s revolutionary discourse was a rhetorical arm to
wage a fierce reform battle with Congress and to gain maximum public support for the
executive  branch’s  legislative  agenda.  Indeed,  although the  Senate  had a  Republican
majority from 1981 to 1987, Democrats controlled the House of Representatives during
Reagan’s entire presidency, with the liberal Democrat Tip O’Neill, a defender of the New
Deal  heritage,  as  the  House  Majority  Leader.  It  was  therefore  necessary  for  the
administration  to  convince  conservative  House  Democrats  to  vote  with  Reagan
Republicans in order for the president’s economic program to have any chance of being
implemented. Ironically, using presidential influence to increase the executive branch’s
legislative  power  runs  contrary  to  both  the  American  Revolution’s  strive  to  limit
executive power and the conservative critique of the New Deal’s legacy of increasing
presidential power. 
26 David Stockman, who co-authored America’s New Beginning (Reagan, 1981b), was a central
figure in leading the negotiations between the administration and members of Congress.
Stockman’s political  odyssey is  revealing in regards to the revolutionary terminology
used to promote the president’s economic plan. Before joining the legions of the New
Right conservative movement, which gained momentum in the 1970s and brought Reagan
to power in 1980 (see Schulman & Zelizer), Stockman had participated in the radical New
Left of the 1960s (Stockman 23-26). “New beginnings” was an expression abundantly used
by the New Left to refer to the democratic revolution it sought to bring about (Mills 15;
Unger 25)—a revolution in the sense of a real overthrow of capitalism and the American
political system in favor of direct democracy and socialism (see Lynd). This revolution
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failed, however, and during the Nixon years Stockman became a “born-again capitalist”
inspired by the works of Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman (Stockman 34). He was
elected as a Republican to the House of Representatives during the Carter years,  and
Jimmy  Carter  was  actually  the  first  president  to  confiscate  the  expression  “new
beginning” for his own purposes. He used it in his inaugural address (1977) to try to
inspire hope in an American people that had gone through the trauma of the Vietnam
War, the Watergate scandal, and the economic hardships of the 1970s. When the Reagan
administration,  with  Stockman as  director  of  the  OMB,  then used  the  expression  to
promote  an  economic  program diametrically  opposed  to  that  of  the  New  Left,  now
conservative Republicans were confiscating left-wing revolutionary rhetoric. Henceforth,
the meaning of revolution was distorted to designate supply-side economic reform. 5
 
The Failed Revolution
27 Given Stockman’s  four-year  experience as  Congressman,  during which he  had ample
opportunity to witness Congress’s ability to inhibit ambitious or controversial  budget
initiatives,  it  is  surprising  that  he  imagined  that  the  Reagan  Revolution  could  have
worked at all.  No fewer than five partial government shutdowns occurred during the
Carter years due to funding gaps. This is what makes Stockman’s 1986 mea culpa all the
more interesting, for he retrospectively concluded not only that revolutionary change
“can’t  be  done”  within  the  American  system,  but  also  that  the  Reagan  Revolution
“shouldn’t have been tried” in the first place (Stockman 15). By his account, if Reagan’s
“new beginning” ended up failing just like the New Left’s, it was precisely because of
resistance within Congress to the administration’s proposed spending cuts and a lack of
genuine radicalism of President Reagan himself:
The fact was, metaphor and reality had been at odds from the very beginning. The
Reagan  Revolution  had  never  been  any  more  real  than  the  Judas  thesis  or  the
woodshed story.  Revolutions  have  to  do  with  drastic,  wrenching  changes  in  an
established regime. Causing such changes to happen was not Ronald Reagan’s real
agenda in the first  place.  It  was mine,  and that  of  a small  cadre of  supply-side
intellectuals.  […]  The  true  Reagan  Revolution  never  had  a  chance.  […]  Our
Madisonian government  of  checks  and balances,  three  branches,  two legislative
houses, and infinitely splintered power is conservative, not radical. […] It cannot
leap into revolutions without falling flat on its face. (8-9)
Ironically, it was the success of the initial tax-cut phase of the economic plan—an emblem
of Reagan-initiated, allegedly trailblazing economic reforms—that prepared the ultimate
failure of the “revolution” (14). In an economic context characterized by soaring inflation
rates (13.5% in 1980) and stagnant or falling real wages since 1973, significant tax cuts
could achieve broad public and political support. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(ERTA) was the largest tax cut in American history: income tax rates were slashed by 30%
over  three  years,  and  the  cuts  were  made  permanent  by  indexing  tax  brackets  on
inflation after 1985. Certain supply-siders believed the tax cuts would pay for themselves
thanks to the increased economic growth they were expected to generate—thus was the
theory of the “Laffer curve” (see Wanniski). Stockman, however, did not believe this for
an instant (71); his equation for balancing the budget presupposed the other part of the
Reagan Revolution:  “draconian reductions on the expenditure side—a substantial  and
politically painful shrinkage of the American welfare state” (Stockman 11). By working
with Congress, he was able to bolster up a coalition between the GOP and conservative
Democrats (182) that made the giant tax cut possible. 
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28 However, a frontal assault on the American welfare state proved to be a political suicide
that neither Congress nor Reagan was willing to risk. Indeed, one of Reagan’s early
missteps, as Hugh Heclo recounts, came in May 1981, when the administration proposed
cuts to Social Security benefits for certain early retirees “based on short-term budget
balancing needs” (Heclo 558).  The Republican-controlled Senate rejected the proposal
unanimously. Having learned his lesson, Reagan went on to work with Tip O’Neill to pass
the 1983 Social  Security Amendments,  which aimed to guarantee the solvency of  the
Social Security system for the next twenty years through a gradual increase in payroll
taxes  and  the  retirement  age.  As  Hugh  Heclo  puts  it,  “if  there  ever  was  anything
resembling a frontal assault on the American welfare state by something that might be
called the ‘Reagan Revolution,’ that assault had essentially ended by 1982” (Heclo 559).
29 David Stockman was already having doubts about how realistic the Reagan Revolution
was  in  late  1981  (see  Greider)  and  later  wrote  that,  by  1982,  he  “knew the  Reagan
Revolution was impossible” (Stockman 14). Given the political and institutional resistance
to significant domestic spending cuts,  along with Reagan’s commitment to increasing
defense  spending in  order  to  assure  America’s  military  superiority in  the  Cold  War,
Stockman says that he quickly realized the 1981 tax cut was a “disastrous fiscal policy”
that would inevitably lead to “triple-digit deficits” with a welfare state largely left intact
(Stockman 14; see also Greider). According to OMB statistics, federal outlays devoted to
Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other social welfare transfer programs indeed
remained roughly stable at 10-12% of the GDP throughout Reagan’s presidency, while
defense outlays and interest payments each increased by 1-2 percentage points (OMB
Table 3.1). Federal receipts, on the other hand, fell by 2 percentage points between 1981
and 1983, during the implementation of the 1981 tax cuts, before regaining one point by
the end of the decade (OMB Table 1.2). As a result, the growth of the size of the federal
government in terms of spending, though “halted,” “was not reversed and remained
roughly stable” (Heclo 559)  during the 1980s,  while the relative loss  of  tax revenues
generated ever-growing deficits, tripling the national debt from about $1 trillion to $3
trillion (OMB Table 7.1). The United States fiscal situation was thus profoundly different
at the end of the decade, but no Reagan Revolution had taken place in the sense of a
“minimalist government—a spare and stingy creature, which offered even-handed public
justice, but no more” (Stockman 9).
 
Undermining the Left in the Future Political and Ideological
Configuration
30 Nevertheless, the new fiscal situation that resulted from the Reagan years, coupled with
Reagan’s persistent use of revolutionary rhetoric to define his political legacy even if it
was contradicted on many levels by the facts, contributed to making a new political and
ideological configuration in which the Left would be marginalized for years to come.
31 First, income tax rate reductions, bracket indexation, and soaring deficits resulted in a
reversal in the logic of tax policymaking. As Don Fullerton explains,
tax policy came to be made in a fashion that is the exact opposite from the previous
era.  Up  until  1981,  Congress  could  return  excess  tax  revenue,  and  undo  the
projected surplus, by granting new special exemptions or deductions. After the rate
cuts  and  indexing  of  ERTA,  Congress  needed  to  undo  the  projected  deficit  by
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deleting such special  provisions.  Thus,  deficit  reduction also leveled the playing
field. (189-190)
Indeed, once the rates had been reduced, it became politically damaging to raise them
again. The new approach to raising tax revenue was therefore to continue to pursue low
rates while eliminating exemptions or deductions so as to broaden the tax base. This was
the basic philosophy behind the Tax Reduction Act of 1986, which brought the top rate
down to 28%—its  lowest  level  since the 1920s—while  simultaneously deleting a  large
number of special provisions (Fullerton 202). While the top rate had been above 90% from
1944 to 1963, and 70% when Reagan came to office, it has remained between 31% and
39.6% ever since Reagan’s presidency (Tax Foundation).
32 In  addition,  Reagan-era  tax  reforms—coupled  with  stagnant  real  wages,  financial
deregulation,  and  anti-unionism—contributed  to  the  relentless  rise  of  inequalities  in
wealth and income that started in the late 1970s (see Piketty & Saez; CBO). Reagan often
justified the 1981 and 1986 top rate reductions—which he counted among his greatest
accomplishments6—by telling the story about how during the 1940s-1960s he and his
Hollywood actor friends would never make more than four films a year because any
additional income they made would be taxed at 91% (Reagan, 1990 117; Stockman 10-11).
Lowering the rates, he argued, would therefore encourage people to work more (Reagan,
1990 117; Stockman 10-11). As Don Fullerton puts it: “The main point of the supply-side is
that incentives matter” (183). Only a small privileged minority, however, had ever been
concerned by the 91% rate,  which indeed had acted as  a  buffer  against  high-income
earners accumulating wealth and income beyond a certain point. Although Reagan’s tax
cuts  did  concern  all  income  levels,  the  huge  top  rate  reductions  disproportionately
favored high-income groups, for whom the fiscal disincentives for ever-higher incomes
were henceforth eliminated.  As Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez have shown, the
income share of  the top 10%, which had remained stable  at  about  32% between the
Second World War and the late 1970s, jumped to 40% between 1980 and 1992. The share of
the top 1% alone, which had steadily declined from 15% during the Second World War to
8% in 1977, shot back up to 13% between 1981 and 1986 (Piketty & Saez 8-11). According
to a 2011 Congressional Budget Office report, the cumulative growth in after-tax income
of the top 1% increased by more than 80% between 1979 and 1988, while that of the
bottom 20% decreased by 10%, and that of the middle 20-80% nearly stagnated (+7%). As
these new trends were to continue in subsequent years, with most of the gains being
captured by the top 1%, the Reagan presidency can indeed be seen as a turning point in
the unequal distribution of income.
33 Liberal Democrats and radicals could denounce these rising inequalities as much as they
liked, but any left-wing solutions involving higher taxes or more government spending
and intervention were largely undermined,  ironically,  by Reagan’s  legacy of  swelling
budget deficits. The evolution of Reagan’s attitude when confronted with the growing
deficits is revealing in this regard. One of his economic advisers “recalled the president’s
views on the deficit going through three stages: one, they won’t occur; two, they’ll be
temporary; three, when they stick, they serve a good purpose—they keep the liberals
from  new  spending  programs”  (Schulman  238).  Indeed,  “Reagan’s  appeal  to  and
continuous fomenting of anti-tax sentiments,” Hugh Heclo writes, “helped make any idea
of increasing taxes to pay for programs an absolute no-go area for all other politicians”
(562). This left liberal Democrats attached to the New Deal and Great Society heritage
politically  isolated,  allowing  the  self-described  “neoliberals”  (Peters)  and  “New
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Democrats” of  the Democratic Leadership Council  (see DLC) to become the dominant
force of the Democratic Party by the early 1990s. The New Democrats denounced the
deficits  and injustices  created during the Reagan years,  but  their  proposed solutions
shared Reagan Republicans’ vision for smaller government, balanced budgets, individual
responsibility, and welfare reform. In other words, Reagan’s actual policy legacy, coupled
with his  use of  revolutionary rhetoric  to  promote his  policy objectives,  substantially
changed the terms of the debates among Democrats in the post-Reagan era.
34 The basic policy orientations of the Reagan administration were formalized in what John
Williamson called the “Washington consensus” (7), that is, a standard package of reforms
recommended both within the United States and abroad to adapt existing institutions to
the  new  demands  of  a  globalized  free  market  economy.  Williamson  admitted  that
Washington did not always “practice what it preaches to foreigners” (7), but it can be
argued  that  this  actually  worked  to  consolidate  the  new  conservative-neoliberal
consensus in the United States. May it be real or imaginary, revolution is about the
future. It is about breaking away from the past and creating a whole new society. Even if
no  Reagan  Revolution  actually  took  place,  the  rhetoric  imposed  an  ideological
equivalency between the idea of revolution and the new reform agenda of free market
capitalism. As such, “The Reagan Revolution” became a synonym for America’s future,
while both big-government liberalism and left-wing radicalism became symbols of the
past. What the Reagan administration had left unachieved then became a task for future
politicians to accomplish—be they Democrats or Republicans.
35 This is apparent in both the rhetoric and content of the Democratic platform of 1992,
with New Democrat Bill Clinton as the presidential candidate. The platform fully indulged
in the rhetoric of revolution, much like Reagan. Denouncing a 12-year “nightmare of
Republican  irresponsibility  and  neglect”  that  had  led,  among  other  things,  to  an
explosion of poverty and a “mountain of public debt,” the platform called for nothing less
than “a revolution in government” (Democratic Party 1). “The Revolution of 1992 is about
a radical change in the way government operates”—but a change that is not based on “the
old notion that there’s a program for every problem,” but rather on “tak[ing] power away
from entrenched bureaucracies and narrow interests in Washington and put[ting] it back
in the hands of ordinary people” (1). The platform then elaborated a reform program
aimed especially at balancing the budget (2), promoting “free enterprise and the power of
market forces” (2), and expanding individual responsibility so as to “break the cycle of
welfare”  (5).  This  did  not  at  all  represent  a  radical  departure  from Reagan’s  policy
objectives, despite New Democrats’ promise of a “third way” and a “national economic
strategy to invest in people” (2). Thus, just like the “Reagan Revolution,” the “Revolution
of 1992” was never about radical regime change; it  meant that both Republicans and
Democrats agreed that big-government liberalism—let alone alternatives to capitalism—
was a thing of the past, while smaller government and freer markets were a blueprint for
the future. As President Clinton stated it bluntly in his 1996 State of the Union Address,
“The era of Big Government is over” (¶ 7).
36 With both major political parties now adhering to this basic vision, subsequent political
divisions would henceforth be centered on the narrowly tailored reforms needed in order
to carry out this agenda. This is why, as previously hinted, some have argued that Clinton
and the New Democrats, rather than offering authentic change, actually “completed” or
“reengineered” the “Reagan Revolution” (Meeropol; Godwin). The only problem is that
there was never a real revolution in the first place—only a shift in policies aimed to
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conserve  the  American  political  and  economic  system,  and  the  use  of  revolutionary
rhetoric to undermine alternatives to those policies. With the New Democrats now using
the term “revolution” to defend policy objectives similar to Reagan’s, the word did not
even mean a significant shift  anymore,  but rather continuity.  Partisan posturing and
revolutionary rhetoric obscured what was actually a growing consensus.
 
Conclusion
37 All  things  considered,  one of  the  ideological  consequences  of  the  Reagan Revolution
rhetoric seems to be that it has served as an ideological buffer against the advent of any
actual political or economic revolution. If “revolution” no longer means a regime change,
but instead a shift to a different reform/counter-reform agenda within the same regime,
or just an alternative approach to carrying out a similar agenda, this tends to hollow out
the very meaning of the word. Authentically radical political alternatives, such as those
that the New Left had tried to popularize in the 1960s, were thus symbolically disqualified
and practically undermined, along with New Deal liberalism. In this sense, taking over
revolutionary left-wing rhetoric and transforming it into something inoffensive to the
established order, while simultaneously isolating left-wing Democrats by making their
policy proposals a political no-go zone in the new fiscal and budgetary context—this is
what can be seen as part of Ronald Reagan’s real legacy.
38 This implies that historians and political scientists must be responsible when choosing
the terms they use to describe the changes that took place in the United States during the
Reagan years and beyond. As we have seen, the term “revolution” seems both misleading
and scientifically inadequate to capture the real extent of these changes. Applying the
same term to both radical government overthrow and to reforms and counter-reforms
within an existing regime fails to capture the difference in nature between these various
types of change. This can only cloud our understanding of the actual events. Moreover, by
reproducing the rhetoric that politicians use for ideological  purposes,  historians may
willingly or unwillingly reinforce a historical narrative that,  upon further analysis,  is
betrayed by the facts. Assuredly, the rhetoric itself is part of history and can have a real
impact on the course of events. Nevertheless, is it not one of the fundamental tasks of the
historical sciences to distinguish between the real and the imaginary?
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NOTES
1. .  David Stockman served under President Reagan from 1981 to 1985 as the Director of the
Office  of  Management  and  Budget  (OMB).  Economist  Martin  Anderson  was  a  top  adviser  to
Reagan throughout his presidency, first serving as his chief domestic policy advisor (1981-1982),
then as a member of the President’s Economic Policy Advisory Board (1982-1989). Peggy Noonan,
a columnist for the The Wall Street Journal, was one of Reagan’s top speech writers.
2. .  Scholars  debate  over  whether  Nixon  was  “the  last  of  the  liberals,  or  the  first  of  the
conservatives” (Schulman 25). In rhetoric, Nixon spoke of the “limits of what Government alone
can do” (Nixon, 1969) and claimed that “Government must learn to take less from people so that
people can do more for themselves” (Nixon, 1973). In practice, however, government spending
and the number of federal agencies and regulations increased significantly during his presidency.
Wilentz (4) and Perlstein (xi) consider the Nixon years as the turning point away from liberal
consensus,  whereas  Hacker  and Pierson (96-100)  situate  the turning point  during the Carter
years.  In  any  case,  most  historians  would  agree  that  the  Reagan  presidency  was  the
“culmination”  (Schulman  218)  of  the  gradual  rise  of  a  conservative  movement  that  gained
momentum in the 1970s. 
3. . The Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 was the primary model for a positive revolution in this
sense.  Lounissi  shows  how  Thomas  Paine  (1737-1809),  the  radical  political  activist  who  had
witnessed  both  the  American  and  the  French  revolutions,  was  one  of  the  theorists  who
contributed to changing the meaning of “revolution” by the end of the 18th century to designate
the passage from one type of regime to a new one based on entirely different principles (Lounissi
93-94).
4. . Ronald Reagan won 50.7% of the popular vote in 1980 and 58.8% of the popular vote in 1984.
According to Gallup polls, the president’s average approval rating was 53% during his eight years
as president, with a first-term average of 50% and a second-term average of 55%. 
5. . According to supply-side economic theory, the key to American economic recovery was to
liberate businesses and workers from high taxes, regulations, and an expensive welfare state.
Businesses could then supply more jobs and goods through increased investment, and workers
could supply more work through increased incentives to earn revenue. The free market and the
private sector were considered superior to government intervention and the public sector. 
6. . “With the tax cuts of 1981 and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I’d accomplished a lot of what I’d
come to Washington to do” (Reagan, 1990, 335).
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ABSTRACTS
Many historical narratives take for granted that a conservative “Reagan Revolution” took place
in the 1980s. Though the gap between the reality and the rhetoric of the Reagan era has been
subject  to  historiographical  debate,  the  expression  is  still  used  today  by  Reagan  critics  and
supporters  alike.  This  article  suggests  that  the  use  of  revolutionary  rhetoric  by  American
conservatives is an ideological tool that tends to undermine the very meaning of revolution, thus
reducing the number of politically viable alternatives that would prompt significant change. This
hypothesis is explored in two ways: first, by analyzing how Ronald Reagan presented both his
policy  objectives  and  his  role  in  American  history  in  terms  of  “revolution”;  and  second,  by
measuring the extent of a selection of actual changes that took place during and after the 1980s,
so as to determine how revolutionary Reagan’s legacy is.
De nombreux récits historiques prennent pour acquis qu’une « révolution reaganienne » a eu lieu
aux États-Unis dans les années 1980. Bien que l’écart entre la réalité et la rhétorique des années
Reagan fasse toujours l’objet de débats historiographiques, l’expression est utilisée aujourd’hui
aussi bien par les adversaires que par les défenseurs de Ronald Reagan. Cet article soutient l’idée
que l’utilisation d’un discours révolutionnaire par les conservateurs américains est une arme
idéologique qui tend à vider le terme « révolution » de son sens et à éliminer symboliquement
toute  alternative  susceptible  de  porter  des  changements  conséquents.  Cette  hypothèse  est
explorée  selon  deux  angles  d’approche :  d’une  part,  en  analysant  la  manière  dont  Reagan  a
présenté  son  programme  politique  et  son  rôle  dans  l’histoire  américaine  en  termes  de
« révolution » ;  d’autre  part,  en  dressant  un  bilan  synthétique  de  la  véritable  portée  d’une
sélection de changements qui  se  sont produits  pendant et après les  années 1980,  de façon à
déterminer s’il convient d’employer le terme « révolution » pour décrire les années Reagan.
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